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Abstract 
 
Unless there is immediate, unprecedented, reduction in global demand for carbon-intensive 
energy and products, then capture and permanent storage of billions of tonnes of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) annually will be needed before mid-century to meet Paris Agreement goals. Yet 
competition from cheaper, temporary, carbon storage means that permanent disposal 
remains starved of investment, currently representing about 0.1% of Energy and Industrial 
Process (EIP) emissions. This stored fraction must reach 100% to stop EIPs causing global 
warming. Here we show that a cost-effective transition can occur by mandating an increasing 
stored fraction through a progressive Carbon Takeback Obligation (CTO) on fossil fuel 
producers and importers. Projected costs of storage to the consumer are lower than pricing 
carbon emissions in conventional 1.5°C scenarios until the 2040s, and comparable or lower 
thereafter. A CTO combined with measures to reduce CO2 production would deliver the 
lowest-risk pathway to achieving net zero. 
 
Background: CO2 storage in ambitious mitigation scenarios 
 
The IPCC’s Special Report on a Global Warming of 1.5°C concluded: “Reaching and sustaining 
net-zero global anthropogenic CO2 emissions and declining net non-CO2 radiative forcing 
would halt anthropogenic global warming on multi-decadal time scales”1. Both conditions will 
need to be met around mid-century to meet the more ambitious goal of the Paris Climate 
Agreement, to “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”2–4. All scenarios 
indicate that demand reduction and substitution alone will be insufficient. To limit cumulative 
emissions of CO2 to deliver these ambitious goals requires some level of active compensatory 
CO2 capture and storage, and eventually compensatory removal of excess CO2 from the 
atmosphere1. It is apparent that even ambitious nations such as Sweden or the UK, are finding 
difficulty in following a 1.5-2°C pathway, with emissions trajectories substantially greater than 
required5. 
 
The need for immense tonnages of permanent geological carbon storage (GCS) to meet 
ambitious mitigation goals is well-documented1. Carbon removal is often conflated with one 
possible technology: Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)6. However, the 
disadvantages and hidden costs of reliance on BECCS are well-documented7,8. In this paper, 
we therefore assume that large-scale BECCS deployment is constrained, with initial CO2 
disposal accomplished through traditional CCS (point source capture with GCS), and 
subsequently through industrial Direct Air Capture (DAC) with GCS (sometimes referred to as 
Direct Air Capture with Carbon Storage, DACCS). We also assume that the scope for offsetting 
energy (in which we here include transport) and industrial process (EIP) emissions with 
“Nature-based Climate Solutions” (NCS) is limited, since of the order of 10 GtCO2/year of CO2 
uptake, which is at the higher end of estimates of NCS potential9, may be required simply to 
offset continued degradation of the biosphere and carbon release from earth system 
feedbacks due to warming10. Sustaining net zero global CO2 emissions over a multi-decade 
period will require net zero or net negative EIP emissions. Recognising these facts simplifies 
the problem, since it allows us to focus exclusively on the challenge of achieving net zero in 
the EIP sector as a necessary condition for halting global warming. 
 
Figure 1a shows net EIP emissions to the atmosphere in cost-effective global Integrated 
Assessment Model (IAM) scenarios that meet the Paris goals through the imposition of 
demand-side measures represented by a global carbon price11,12. Global EIP emissions in 
scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C (dark blue) or well below 2°C (light blue) decline rapidly 
to reach net zero either by mid-century or before 2100 respectively. Red scenarios show an 
idealised 1.5°C-consisent supply-side policy, a global CTO, discussed below. Figure 1b shows 
that significant quantities of CO2 continue to be produced from fossil sources even as 
emissions decline to net zero in the IAM scenarios, much of this in “hard-to-abate sectors”, 
including aviation, marine shipping, steel and cement production, and load-balancing in 
power grids13. Net zero emissions to the atmosphere are achieved by progressively balancing 
this CO2 production with GCS (figure 1c). Scenarios that explicitly exclude or minimise reliance 
on GCS14,15 have shown it is possible to limit warming to 1.5°C, but only through some 
combination of unprecedented behaviour or technological innovation, leveraged at sensitive 
intervention points of the socio-economic system16. Neither of these can be objectively priced 
for direct comparison with least-cost scenarios, nor do they appear to be reliable prospects 
at present, suggesting a need for a “backstop” policy in case they fail to materialise17. 
 
Figure 1d suggests a form this backstop might take. Blue lines present the IAM scenarios, 
plotting the fraction of CO2 generated by EIP that is geologically stored (the ratio 1c/1b18). 
This stored fraction has a very similar shape across almost all 1.5°C scenarios, rising 
parabolically to 100% by the date of net zero around mid-century18. This shape is inevitable 
for the most ambitious scenarios, because the stored fraction is currently close to zero and 
not increasing significantly, so the smoothest pathway to 100% (re)capture and storage, 
which is required by definition for net zero EIP emissions, is a quadratic increase. Some degree 
of smoothness is imposed by the constraints of capital and technology deployment rates, but 
our conclusions are robust to the precise shape of this curve: see supplementary information 
figure S1 for the corresponding figure assuming a cubic increase in stored fraction. The well-
below-2°C scenarios show more degrees of freedom, but many also conform to this generic 
quadratic pathway. The red line shows a stylised scenario in which this fraction is increased 
quadratically through a supply-side policy we name a Carbon Takeback Obligation (CTO). 
 
Carbon Takeback: from “polluter pays” to “producer responsibility”  
 
To a good approximation, CO2-induced warming is proportional to the total stock of carbon 
dioxide emitted into the atmosphere19–22 minus that which is actively removed and returned 
to the geosphere. Demand-side policies such as carbon pricing are designed to reduce the 
flow of emissions, but are less well-suited to limit the total stock. The main reason is 
technology and policy uncertainty. In IAMs, GCS is deployed at scale, at a predictable cost and 
with presumed public consent, in anticipation of increasing global carbon prices: hence the 
relatively smooth increase in the stored fraction in the blue lines in figure 1d. But these IAMs 
are cost-optimised over the entire century. Deployment takes into account future carbon 
prices. There is no guarantee that this orderly deployment with perfect foresight will take 
place in reality. Figure 1d indicates that 11% of EIP CO2 production should be geologically 
stored by 2030 on a smooth, quadratic, least-cost pathway to net zero by 2050. No country, 
even those with net zero targets, monitors or reports this stored fraction in their Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC), so, unsurprisingly, current planned sequestration 
deployment is completely inadequate. The UK, for example, will achieve a stored fraction of 
only 1-2% of EIP CO2 emissions stored by 2030 because ambition is set by a policy ceiling of 
two pilot projects, capturing from industry23. By contrast independent statutory advisers to 
the UK government recommend storage of at least 10MtCO2/yr operating by 2030, increasing 
to at least 75-175 Mt/yr CO2 stored in 2050 required for net zero24. In a global perspective, 
CO2 storage needs to be operating at a commercial scale by 2030 to have any prospect of 
reaching 5 GtCO2/yr by 2050 and 10 GtCO2/yr by 210025. Storage needs are unequally 
distributed, operating in 2050 in developed economies and China at 2 tCO2 per person per 
year plus an additional 1.7 tCO2 per year DAC, with storage of only 0.5 tCO2 per person per 
year in emerging economies26.  However in 2019, only 19 large CCS projects operated globally 
capturing and storing just 40 MtCO2/yr, with 32 in construction or planning, making scale-up 
terminally slow27. The reason is that CO2 capture and storage is still seen as a relatively 
expensive means of reducing the near-term flow of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere, rather 
than as the only means available of addressing specific hard-to-abate sectors and 
permanently extending the overall stock of CO2 production that is consistent with meeting 
any ambitious climate goal. All current projects depend to some degree on the tax-payer, 
through direct procurement, subsidies or tax-breaks. While such incentives are necessary for 
first-of-a-kind investments, a transition plan to a sustainable financing model must be built in 
from the start to maintain confidence on all sides and avoid perverse incentives and “subsidy 
lock-in”.  
 
Everyone involved in the production and emission of CO2 from fossil sources is depleting the 
total remaining stock that can be emitted to the atmosphere before initiating dangerous 
climate change. Hence both producers and consumers have a collective responsibility to 
contribute to the development of GCS to ensure a smooth transition to net zero emissions as 
that stock is exhausted. Noting that one of the clearest beneficiaries of successful GCS 
development are the owners of fossil fuel assets, a simple way of discharging this 
responsibility is the Carbon Takeback Obligation (CTO). Under a CTO, primary extractors or 
importers of fossil carbon (including non-fuel sources such as lime for cement) are required 
to demonstrate permanent sequestration of a progressively increasing fraction of the CO2 
generated by the production, refining, transport and use of the products they sell. This 
fraction increases to 100%, ensuring net zero EIP CO2 emissions, by a specified target date, 
and could exceed 100% if necessary to support net CO2 removal thereafter. To be 
commensurate with the climate impact of CO2 emissions, permanent storage must be 
interpreted as securing captured CO2 in reservoirs with lifetimes greater than 10,000 years, a 
standard that is currently met only by GCS or alkaline metal remineralisation pathways28. If 
applied across an entire jurisdiction, the cost of a CTO would be shared between producers 
and consumers of carbon-intensive products.  
 
To calculate a net-zero-compliant CTO pathway, it is necessary to know only the date of 
adoption, the date of net zero, and the shape of the profile. This minimises subjectivity, 
maximises transparency and makes it simple to explain, monitor and enforce. The red line in 
Figure 1d shows a quadratic increase from 0% in 2020 to 100% by 2050, consistent with the 
shape of the IAM cost-effective 1.5°C scenarios, reaching 11% by 2030 and 44% by 2040. In 
other words, the 1.5°C scenarios show a quadratically-increasing stored fraction as a 
hypothetical result of demand-side climate measures, a result which is by no means 
guaranteed and looking increasingly unlikely because policy uncertainty is discouraging 
investment in GCS. In contrast, the CTO pathway uses a similar pathway as a driver of 
behaviour to ensure that the desired outcome, net zero EIP emissions around 2050, is 
achieved. A more convex profile would back-load the burden of GCS deployment onto later 
decades, raising questions of temporal equity since those decades will also be experiencing 
the highest impacts of climate change over this transition period. Despite this concern, our 
conclusions are robust to the adoption of a cubic profile, which would correspond to a 
scenario in which a quadratic CTO is applied to a linearly increasing fraction of global fossil 
carbon use, only reaching 100% in 2050 (see Supp. Info. fig. S1).  
 
A global CTO would be most simply implemented at the point of extraction, as a licensing 
condition for participation in international markets. But initially, a CTO could be introduced 
to a single country or trading bloc, levied and discharged most efficiently on those very few 
organisations owning fossil carbon at the point of extraction or import into that jurisdiction. 
If imposed on all extractors and importers of fossil fuels, costs of CO2 disposal are initially 
small (because the stored fraction starts small) and can be passed downstream to consumers, 
limiting impact on competition and the threat of carbon leakage. Unlike carbon taxes and 
other levies aimed at changing consumer behaviour, however, there is a transparent link 
between a CTO and achieving net zero emissions. In the absence of a fossil fuel ban or 
prohibitively expensive tax-payer-funded CO2 removal programme, a CTO is the only way of 
achieving net zero EIP emissions, the only way of stopping fossil fuels causing global warming, 
and hence the only way of any jurisdiction permanently “ending its contribution to global 
warming”29.  
 
This type of obligation, a form of Extended Producer Responsibility, has precedent,  for 
example with the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive in the EU30, and 
the California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) in the US31. A CTO may be thought of as 
requiring vendors of fossil carbon to dispose of the unwanted CO2 “packaging” that 
accompanies the energy they sell, or applying a LCFS upstream to decarbonise fossil fuels 
themselves. Crucially, under a CTO producers would take responsibility not just for their direct 
emissions from owned, controlled or purchased sources (Scope 1 & 2, already covered in 
some jurisdictions by conventional demand-side carbon pricing), but also for indirect 
emissions generated by the products they sell (Scope 3)32. This is consistent with the 
ambitions of some European fossil fuel companies that have begun to set aspirational net 
zero targets that encompass scope 3 emissions33. A regulatory CTO framework would create 
a level playing-field, allowing companies to invest in GCS without the concern that this might 
put them at a competitive disadvantage.  
 
Implications of a Carbon Takeback Obligation 
 
A crucial feature of the CTO is that it does not, itself, prescribe or proscribe the rate of 
production of CO2, only the fraction of that production that is stored. It is therefore a type of 
intensity target, which are generally more acceptable to developing countries than absolute 
emission limits, improving the prospects for wider participation in a CTO than in any global 
cap-and-trade regime. This flexibility has other implications. Red shaded plumes in figure 1 
show Paris-compliant emissions pathways in which the stored fraction follows the same 
quadratic path to 100%, or net zero EIP emissions, in 2050. By contrast CO2 production is 
bounded by two scenarios: one which assumes that consumption declines as the stored 
fraction rises (solid bound) to give a linear decline in net EIP annual emissions from 2020 to 
2050; and another where gross EIP CO2 production continues along the median SSPX-45 
pathway (dashed bound) despite very high expenditure on GCS (we are not suggesting this is 
a plausible scenario, but it illustrates the range of pathways open). After 2050, the stored 
fraction either remains at 100% (solid) or rises above 100% (dashed) to a level that results in 
the same net cumulative emissions to 2100. Both scenarios deliver net zero EIP emissions in 
2050 and the same post-2100 climate outcome, but the dashed, high-consumption scenario 
results in higher peak warming and requires substantially more CO2 storage.  
 
Panels e and f compare the estimated costs of a global CTO with the cost of abatement in 
conventional price-driven scenarios. Panel e compares the cost of complying with a CTO per 
ton of CO2 produced (red) with the effective global carbon price in conventional scenarios 
(blue). This per-tonne CTO compliance cost is a function of the stored fraction (1d) and the 
full-chain cost to capture, transport, and permanently store one tonne of CO2. If the initial 
objective of a CTO is incentivising the development of a CO2 storage industry to complement 
other climate change mitigation measures, then any CO2 that would otherwise have been 
emitted to the atmosphere could be used to generate a tradeable storage certificate to 
discharge a CTO, with safeguards to ensure CO2 is not generated purely for the purpose of 
storage34. Hence we assume an initial full chain cost range of C1 = $40-60/tCO2 stored, 
representing the cheapest, high-purity CO2 capture opportunities35–37.  
 
By 2050, we assume conservatively that all remaining fossil fuel use and industrial process 
emissions result from non-stationary or diffuse applications like aviation for which capture at 
source is not possible, giving a cost C2 = $200-600/tCO2 stored which reflects a range of 
plausible costs for DAC+GCS37,38. Although all costs are likely to drop over time, the dominant 
effect will be a transition toward ever more diffuse streams of CO2 once all remaining point 
sources have been captured, culminating in reliance on DAC. We model this transition as a 
simple straight line progression from C1 and C2 as the stored fraction S increases, giving a 
stylised cost of CTO compliance C(S) = S(C1+(C2-C1)S) per tonne of CO2 produced. At 11% 
sequestration, for example, the CTO compliance cost for a whole jurisdiction represents only 
11% of the capture and storage cost of CO2, or $6-13 per tonne of CO2 generated under these 
assumptions, because it is distributed over all fossil fuels used in a jurisdiction, not just those 
that are subject to capture. Despite these conservatively high cost assumptions, this supply-
side CTO compliance cost is much lower than the demand side carbon prices required to 
deliver the equivalent climate outcome until the 2040s, and remains comparable or lower 
thereafter (see figure 1e).  
 
Conventional mitigation scenarios focused on pricing emissions consistently show carbon 
prices of about $1000/tCO2 are required to achieve net zero emissions around mid-century 
(see figure S2 in supplementary information). Such prices could still occur in the absence of 
a CTO even if DAC+GCS costs are limited to $200-600/tCO2 because DAC and particularly 
GCS take time to deploy at scale. If, as at present, deployment rates fail to anticipate future 
carbon prices, then GCS and DAC are only deployed when all cheaper methods of reducing 
emissions are exhausted, and hence may not be available at scale when needed, leading to 
a need for very high carbon prices to “drive out” the last emissions39. Introducing a CTO now 
eliminates the risk of carbon prices ever exceeding the cost of DAC+GCS.   
 
Figure 1f shows the total cost of the CTO compared to modelled reductions in global income 
in ambitious mitigation scenarios compared to the relevant baseline SSPX-45 scenario. This is 
a heuristic comparison, because we have not modelled the interaction of the CTO with other 
climate policies and the rest of the economy (although any such interaction would be heavily 
contingent on the details of how a CTO were implemented). It does, however, serve to 
illustrate two important points. First, the solid red curve shows that, if accompanied by a 
halving of total EIP CO2 production over the next 30 years (see figure 1b), the cost of 
compliance with a CTO (peaking at around 1.5% of global GDP by mid-century) could be lower 
than even the most optimistic estimates of the cost of achieving the same climate goals in a 
conventional scenario driven by a global carbon price. This does not mean that the total 
economic impact of a CTO would be less than that of a global carbon price, because this 
compliance cost alone does not capture it. It does, however, indicate that a “second best” 
regulatory measure may be close in cost to an optimal pathway while also offering non-
monetary advantages, such as certainty for investment in CO2 storage and a transparent link 
between policy and outcome. These advantages may outweigh any economic inefficiency.  
 
The second point is that it would be myopic to rely on a CTO alone. Compliance with a CTO 
would have very little impact on consumption in the short term because the cost per tonne 
of CO2 generated ($6-13 for 11% sequestration in 2030) is lower even than current carbon 
prices. However, if consumption remains at SSPX-45 levels (dashed red curve), the total 
amount spent on CTO compliance rises rapidly. With the pessimistic high price final DAC+GCS 
cost of $600/tCO2 and (implausibly) no impact on CO2 production, the cost of CTO compliance 
could reach 10% of global GDP in 2050, approaching (but not exceeding) global income losses 
due to conventional emissions price- and tax-based mitigation measures in the highest-cost 
1.5°C scenarios. 
 
The principle of progressively increasing the stored fraction of CO2 produced by burning 
fossil fuels through some form of producer obligation was first put forward in 200940 and 
expanded towards a CTO in 2015, when it was even proposed in draft UK legislation41, 
although concerns were raised at the time about the potential cost and implications for 
competitiveness. CTO remains one policy option formally under consideration by UK 
government, and is still to be explored42. We have shown that the cost of compliance with a 
CTO can be comparable to and in most cases less than the cost of achieving similar climate 
objectives through traditional demand-side carbon pricing alone. That said, exclusive 
reliance on a CTO could result in increased near-term fossil fuel extraction and lock in high-
carbon infrastructure resulting in higher peak warming and higher policy cost overall. All 
continued fossil fuel use without a proven and scalable CO2 storage capability contributes to 
the risk of a precipitous transition when the stock of CO2 that can be dumped into the 
atmosphere is exhausted. The unique value of the CTO is to create a market for CO2 storage, 
spreading the cost of reducing this transition risk over all current fossil fuel users through a 
simple regulatory framework and at no cost to the taxpayer. It can therefore be 
implemented alongside existing actions such as the EU-ETS, provincial taxes, or federal 
carbon pricing. A CTO, combined with such measures to reduce CO2 production, would 
deliver the lowest-risk pathway to achieving net zero. 
 
Methods 
 
The IIASA SSP database9 contains a number of variants of the SSPs as outputted by 5 IAMs 
(AIM/CGE, GCAM4, IMAGE, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, REMIND-MAGPIE, WITCH-GLOBIOM), 
representing complementary narratives for societal evolution over the 21st century whilst 
sampling climate policy of varying ambition8,10. Figure 1 shows cost-effective scenarios driven 
by a global carbon price, not including scenarios that explicitly minimise use of GCS14,15 and 
deliver climate goals through exogenously imposed additional measures such as consumer 
behaviour change, noting that “it is nearly impossible to put a price tag on most of these 
measures, none of the scenarios [with these additional measures] has been evaluated in 
terms of costs”15. CO2 production in 1b excludes CO2 generated by bioenergy (hence assuming 
this is captured contemporaneously — scenarios include fossil CO2 associated with bioenergy 
production and transport), while CO2 sequestration in 1c includes CO2 stored from bioenergy, 
providing the net total rate of GCS. Stored fraction in 1d is simply the ratio of 1c/1b18. Carbon 
prices in 1e are taken directly from the SSP database, while the reduction in global GDP in 1f 
is taken relative to the corresponding SSPX-45 scenario. We are using SSPX-45 as a “current 
policies” scenario under which emissions peak around 2030, remain stable to mid-century 
and then decline but fail to reach zero by 2100, leading to a 2100 warming around 3°C and 
continued warming thereafter. Hence we are comparing the impact of a CTO assumed to be 
additional to current policies with the impact of more stringent climate policies required to 
meet 1.5°C and below-2°C climate goals. Figure S1 is identical to figure 1 but assumes a cubic 
increase in global stored fraction under the CTO scenario. Figure S2 shows that an 
approximately straight-line relationship between 2050 carbon prices and 2050 EIP emissions 
emerges as climate policy ambition is varied under each of the SSP socio-economic scenarios, 
with the SSPs ranked by global primary energy consumption over the century. Scenarios with 
higher primary energy consumption show higher emissions for carbon prices in the range of 
$10-100 per tCO2, but also greater sensitivity of 2050 emissions to 2050 carbon prices (the 
slopes of the best-fit lines). Across all SSPs, achieving net zero emissions in 2050 appears to 
require a carbon price around $1,000 per tCO2 under scenarios that rely on demand-side 
carbon pricing alone. By contrast, using CO2 storage on the supply-side limits prices to less 
than the cost of DAC+GCS, estimated at $200-600 per tCO2 
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Figure 1: Comparing conventional mitigation scenarios with a global Carbon Takeback Obligation (CTO). Blue lines show 
cost-effective IAM scenarios plotted for multiple models and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and two levels of 
climate ambition: SSPX-1.9 “1.5°C” (dark blue) and SSPX-2.6 “well-below 2°C” (light blue). A stylised CTO policy is overlaid 
in red. Panel a plots the global annual Energy and Industrial Processes (EIP) CO2 emissions between 2020-2100 (GtCO2/yr), 
which is the difference between gross annual EIP CO2 production from fossil sources (b) and annual CO2 sequestration (c)., 
which also includes sequestration from bioenergy. Panel d plots the stored fraction, or fraction of EIP CO2 produced from 
fossil sources that is stored using GCS in each year. Panel e plots the carbon price driving the mitigation in the IAMs shown 
in panel a ($2005), compared with the cost of compliance with the CTO, while panel f shows the reduction in GDP relative to 
the SSPX-4.5 used as a proxy for “current policies” scenario compared with aggregate expenditure on compliance with the 
CTO. In all panels the solid line scenario assumes that consumption declines as the stored fraction rises (solid bound) to 
give a linear decline in net EIP annual emissions from 2020 to 2050; whilst the dashed red line scenario assumes gross EIP 
CO2 production continues along the median SSPX-45 pathway (dashed bound) despite very high expenditure on GCS. The 
shaded region encompasses the plausible range of 1.5°C-consistent pathways in between these two bounding cases.  
